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Abstract
Many consider Nozick’s “utility monster”—a being more e-
cient than ordinary people at converting resources into well-
being, with no upper limit—to be a damning counterexample
to utilitarianism. But our intuitions may be reversed by con-
sidering a variation in which the utility monster starts from a
baseline status ofmassive suering. This suggests a rethinking
of the force of the original objection.
Introduction
Nozick (1974, 41) famously objected that “Utilitarian theory is
embarrassed by the possibility of utility monsters who get enor-
mously greater gains of utility from any sacrice of others than
these others lose. For, unacceptably, the theory seems to require
that we all be sacriced in the monster’s maw, in order to increase
total utility.”
*Thanks to Theron Pummer, Helen Yetter-Chappell, and anonymous referees,
for helpful comments.
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After isolating the distinctive feature of this objection (in contrast
to standard demandingness and rights-sacrice objections), I show
how it can be undermined by considering a variation in which the
utility monster starts from a position of massive suering. I close
by considering the implications for the original objection.
1 Isolating the Objection
The utility monster scenario may seem intuitively objectionable
for many reasons, but only one is the intended target of this pa-
per. Some may object to any general requirement of sacrice to
help others, however deserving those others may be. But this gen-
eral demandingness objection to utilitarianism is not my target here.
Others may object to the putative rights violations involved in
harming some to benet others (again, no matter how deserving
those others might be). Such general concerns about utilitarian
sacrice are not my target here. Beyond these familiar objections
(which might as well be illustrated by any number of other possi-
ble examples), I take there to be a further objection in the running
which is more distinctively supported by the utility monster sce-
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nario in particular. This objection draws on the nature of the
utilitarian beneciary: that in this case, it is just one individual, set
against everyone else in the world. The utility monster objection, as I
understand it, thus rests upon the apparent absurdity of allowing
a single individual’s interests to trump everyone else’s.
A standard response to this objection is to question whether the
utility monster scenario is really coherent (Part 1984, 389). How
well-o (in terms of wellbeing, not resources) can a single individ-
ual be? We may plausibly hold there to be a cap or upper bound
on how high one’s wellbeing can go, such that benets to one (start-
ing from a neutral baseline) simply cannot be suciently large to
outweigh great harms to a great many.
I, for one, cannot positively conceive of such a high level of well-
being as to render sacricing all to Nozick’s monster a genuinely
utility-maximizing act. And I doubt that I am unusual in this; I
expect such imaginative resistance to the scenario to be common-
place. If so, that would seem to suce to explain our intuitive
aversion to sacricing all to the monster, without necessarily un-
dermining utiltiarian theory at all.
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2 The Negative Utility Monster
Wemay attempt to restore coherence to the utility monster sce-
nario in two steps. First, we allow the benets to the monster to be
spread out over time. Perhaps each sacrice we make to the mon-
ster gives it another century of maximally good life, for example.
This might already be enough for some to think that beneting
the monster isn’t such an obviously wrong option. But I don’t
think it suces, as there are strong intuitive grounds for denying
a simple additive view of how additional good life contributes to
one’s lifetime wellbeing.
Consider: it would seem prudentially irrational to give up a guar-
anteed fty additional years of good life for a 50% chance of one
hundred additional good years (and 50% chance of instant death),
even assuming no debilitation from aging. One hundred good
years for an individual intuitively isn’t twice as valuable as fty.
Why not? One possible explanation is that a large component of
our lifetime wellbeing is determined by certain core projects that
can be fully achieved within a normal lifespan. Ensuring that one’s
life is not too short to achieve such core projects can thus make a
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huge dierence to one’s lifetime wellbeing, whereas any period of
additional years beyond what’s needed is relegated to the status of
a minor bonus.
If that’s right, then we cannot secure massive welfare gains for
the utility monster just by massively increasing the quantity of
good life that they experience. To fully x the thought experi-
ment, I propose that, besides spreading out benets over time,
we additionally shift the monster’s baseline welfare level. For, as
Part (1984 chp. 18) noted, the badness of aggregate suering can-
not plausibly be capped. As a result, we may make the monster’s
baseline wellbeing level as deeply negative as you care to imag-
ine, just by imagining him to be arbitrarily long-lived, unkillable,
and suering immensely at every moment that he lives. There
is now the potential for the interests of this one “Negative Utility
Monster”—call him “NUM”—to really be suciently great in mag-
nitude as to outweigh (in utilitarian terms) the interests of all us
ordinary mortals. It becomes less clear that utilitarians need feel
“embarrassed” about their verdict in this case, however.
To set up the case most neatly (avoiding confounding intuitions
about demandingness, rights, and so forth), let us restrict our
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focus to the question of how we ought to allocate some great
pile of antecedently unallocated resources. There are, of course, a
great many people who could benet from havingmore resources.
But suppose that, in each instance, the marginal benet to NUM
of granting him the additional resource (in terms of reducing
his suering and even allowing his life to contain some positive
moments in their place) would far outweigh the gains anyone else
could get from the resource in question. Any resource that might
provide a week of relief from mild suering for a human could
instead provide a year of relief from torturous agony for NUM,
let’s say. The utilitarian verdict is, then, that we should give all the
resources to NUM. But this does not strike me as an embarrassing
verdict at all. Indeed, it strikes me as very plausibly correct.
This doesn’t suce to defend utilitarianism against all possible
objections, of course. The restriction to unallocated resources
was precisely designed to sidestep some of the most pressing in-
tuitive objections to utilitarian sacrice. But whatever other ob-
jections one might have, the present discussion should at least
serve to undermine the distinctive force of the utility monster
objection, understood (as above) as suggesting that a single individ-
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ual’s interests—however great—should not be allowed to outweigh
everyone else’s combined. For it seems, in the above case, that
NUM’s interests do and should outweigh all others.
To make the case more awkward for utilitarians, suppose we re-
move our restriction to unallocated resources, and raise the further
question whether resources previously held by others should be
redistributed to NUM to give him further relief. Again, we are to
suppose that the relief he gains far outweighs the harm done to
those who are newly deprived of their resources (even if they die
as a result). To cancel any complications stemming from our in-
strumental value to future generations, suppose it is guaranteed
that there will be no future generations in any case. Humanity can
either enjoy itself for a last few years before collapsing, or we may
end ourselves prematurely in service of relieving NUM’s remain-
ing suering. In this case, I grant that the utilitarian verdict—that
we must all sacrice ourselves to NUM—is much less obviously
correct (there are, by design, reasonable grounds for objection that
were missing from the previous case). But it remains, I believe, a
perfectly defensible—and entirely unembarrassing—verdict.
Utilitarians may, for example, reasonably judge their critics here
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to be inuenced by an unjust status-quo bias: unjustiably favour-
ing those of us in a privileged starting position relative to poor
suering NUM. Why should NUM have to suer so, just because
the resources he so needs are initially to be found in our posses-
sion? To lose my life would of course be a great cost to me, but
not nearly so great as the centuries of torturous agony that would
otherwise be suered by NUM. So it would seem unsurprising
(and certainly no cause for embarrassment) for an impartial moral
view to judge NUM’s interests here to be of greater moral weight
than my own.
3 Implications
We’ve found that the Negative Utility Monster seems less intu-
itively threatening to utilitarianism than Nozick’s original monster
did. What can we learn from this? One immediate upshot, I’ve
suggested, is to undermine the original objection, for NUM shows
us that there’s nothing necessarily objectionable about having the
interests of one individual outweigh all others. But why, then, did
Nozick’s case seem so damning? I see two possible explanations.
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The rst explanation is that we are simply misled by an unwitting
divergence between the arguably incoherent theoretical stipu-
lations of the original utility monster scenario (as involving an
unbounded capacity for positive utility) and the (capped-utility)
scenario that we actually end up imagining. If any creature that
you imagine necessarily has a modest upper bound on how well-
o it can possibly get, then of course it would be terribly wrong to
sacrice all others merely to make this one individual a bit more
happy than he already was. It would also be terribly bad, in terms
of utility or net welfare. Our intuitive judgment about the capped-
utility scenario is thus not in conict with utilitarianism. And if the
alternative, of unbounded positive utility, is indeed incoherent or
otherwise unimaginable for us, then this capped-utility scenario
is the only one we can bring to mind when prompted to make an
intuitive judgment about Nozick’s utility monster. That is, we cor-
rectly judge that it’d be a terrible mistake to feed everyone to the
monster we imagine upon reading Nozick’s thought experiment.
Our error is to assume that the monster we have imagined is one
that matches Nozick’s stipulations, such that utility would really
be maximized by sacricing everyone else.
9
Some readers may nd the above explanation tendentious, how-
ever, as it crucially relies upon the assumption that we cannot
really imagine a positive utility monster at all. Some readers may
be inclined to insist that, whatever imaginative blocks others of
us might face, they can imagine it perfectly well. That is, they can
imagine a creature such that it would be transparently good (in
terms of utility) to sacrice all others to it. And when they imagine
this, it nonetheless strikes them as a morally bad outcome. What
can be said to one who takes this view?
If they share my sense that utilitarianism yields plausible verdicts
regarding the negative utility monster, such a defender of the Noz-
ickian monster may naturally wonder what the relevant dierence
between the two cases is. They reject my rst explanation—that
the Nozickian monster is incoherent or otherwise unimaginable.
So let me oer an alternative suggestion.
The central dierence between the two cases is the monster’s base-
line level of wellbeing. A presumed neutral (or positive) baseline
aords opportunities to boost the monster’s happiness (as in Noz-
ick’s case), whereas the negative starting condition of NUMmeans
that increments to his welfare instead take the form of relieving
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or osetting suering. This is all very suggestive of the standard
prioritarian intuition that benets to an individual matter more
the worse-o that individual is (Part 1997). On a prioritarian
account, it will be very dicult to justify greatly harming or sacri-
cing people merely to provide benets to others who are already
reasonably well-o (let alone to a single such individual). NUM,
by contrast, is the worst-o individual in existence, and so has
high priority given to his interests when we are in a position to
aid him.1
It thus seems that the utility monster scenario is really just pump-
ing standard prioritarian intuitions, rather than providing the
basis for a distinctively compelling objection to utilitarianism in
its own right. This result, too, is arguably less troubling for util-
itarians than the supposedly damning objection that we began
with. Utilitarians will already have something to say about priori-
tarianism. Some may consider it a suciently minor variant on
their own view that they are not concerned to dispute it. Others
may be happy to demote our prioritarian judgments to the status
1Though, as Pummer (n.d.) notes, prioritarians may face distinctive “Priority
Monster” problems if an individual like NUM is somuch worse-o than the rest
of us that the slightest relief to them is allowed to justify imposing great harms
upon everyone else.
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of useful heuristics for promoting utility in the face of (e.g.) the
diminishing marginal utility of resources and the greater scope
for improvement when we focus on the worse-o (cf. Greene and
Baron 2001). Either way, assimilating the utility monster to the
more familiar challenge of prioritarian intuitions should prove a
comforting result for utilitarians.
One important proviso: there remains room for one to hold that
it’s better to distribute benets broadly, evenwhen this goes against
prioritarianism. Suppose that NUM is at -220 wellbeing, and
nine other individuals are just slightly better-o, at -200. Further
suppose that we have ten resources to distribute, each of which
could either relieve two points of suering for NUM, or one for
any other individual. Some people may prefer to distribute the
resources equally (yielding -218 wellbeing for NUM and -199 for
the other nine) rather than giving all the resources to NUM to
equalize wellbeing at -200.2
In response to such intuitions, I would want to hear more about
how such a verdict could be justied in principle—why regard
a broader distribution of benets to be fairer or better when an-
2Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this case.
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tecedent inequalities meant that some had greater need? Identical
treatmentmay be what’s fair when all involved have identical inter-
ests, but when this background condition isn’t met it would instead
seem fundamentally unfair to treat those with greater needs (and
greater capacity to benet from intervention) no dierently than
those who are already better-o.
So, I would dispute the critic’s proposed verdict in this case. But
perhaps I’m wrong about that. Even so, the critic’s intuitive judg-
ment here seems likely to be, at best, highly tentative. Utilitarians
may judge the case dierently, without embarrassment. So even
if people can reasonably disagree with utilitarian verdicts in cases
that set the interests of one against many (the distinctive feature of
the utility monster case), this does not seem to provide the basis
for a decisive or even particularly forceful objection. The intuitive
force of Nozick’s original case is better accounted for via my two
earlier explanations.
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4 Conclusion
Nozick’s utility monster should no longer be seen as a damning
objection to utilitarianism. The intuitive force of the case is under-
mined by considering a variant with immensely negative wellbe-
ing. Oering signicant relief to such a “Negative Utility Monster”
plausibly should outweigh smaller harms or benets to others. Our
diverging intuitions about the two kinds of utility monsters may
be explained conservatively as involving standard prioritarian in-
tuitions: holding that benets matter more the worse-o their
recipient is (and matter less, the better-o their recipient is). This
verdict undermines the distinctiveness of the utility monster ob-
jection, and reduces its force to whatever level one attributes to
prioritarian intuitions in general. More ambitiously, the diver-
gence between the two cases may be taken to support attempts
to entirely explain away the original utility-monster intuition,
e.g. as illicitly neglecting the existence of an upper bound on the
monster’s wellbeing. Such an explanation, if successful, suggests
that our intuition about the original utility monster scenario was
based on a mistake. Either way, the force of Nozick’s objection is
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signicantly undermined by the Negative Utility Monster.
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